The decision by the Council of the European Union to extend Operation SPIDES (a military naval mission launched in the Red Sea in early 2024 to protect merchant ships from attacks, within the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy) until February 28, 2026, with a reference amount exceeding 17 million euros, is not an administrative detail, but a clear political and economic signal at the heart of the Red Sea crisis that directly affects global trade and supply chains.The Council linked this extension to a comprehensive strategic review of the operation, then added a new and expanded dimension of allowing the collection of information not only to protect commercial ships, but also to monitor arms smuggling and the activity of so-called shadow fleets, with the aim of sharing this information with EU countries, the European Commission, and specialized international bodies such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), the European Police Agency (Europol), and the International Maritime Organization (Council of the European Union, 2025).
This expansion of the operation's mandate clearly means that SPIDES is no longer just a defensive escort mission for ships in transit, but rather a surveillance and security knowledge management platform in a sea lane that has become part of an international struggle over traffic rules, threat levels, and the cost of maritime insurance. The significance of this extension becomes even more apparent when we place SPIDES in the context of competing security alliances operating in the Red Sea and neighboring lanes.The EU opted for a purely defensive version of the operation, focusing on protecting and escorting ships and promoting what is called maritime awareness in the operational area, while explicitly emphasizing that no military strikes will be carried out on land, and working in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2722, which demands an end to attacks on ships and recognizes the right to defend navigation in accordance with international law (European External Action Service, 2025).
This approach distinguishes SPIDES from other approaches that have at some stages adopted offensive deterrence, and gives Brussels the political space to say it is protecting freedom of navigation without slipping into a wider regional war. However, this defensiveness does not mean complete neutrality; decisions such as which ships are protected, how escort resources are allocated, and how risk levels are categorized have a direct political and economic impact on the market.In June 2025, the commander of Operation Espedes said that ship traffic in the Red Sea had increased by 60% since August 2024 to 36-37 ships per day, but remained below pre-attack levels of 72-75 ships per day. He also noted that the operation had escorted 476 ships to date, and that available resources often limited to two to three warships at a time, creating delays of up to a week for companies requesting protection (Reuters, 2025).
This is where the naval alliance becomes a direct economic factor: each escort window means reduced risk, each delay means a cost in time and fleet capacity, all of which reshape freight rates and traffic decisions, whether through the Suez Canal or around the Cape of Good Hope in Africa.
The first channel is the insurance channel: lowering the perceived risk leads to lower war risk insurance premiums, while increasing the threat leads to a complete repricing of the voyage, thus the party able to manage the threat level has an indirect ability to control the global trade bill. The second channel is the rules and regulation channel: when the European Union announces that it will collect information on shadow fleets and arms smuggling and share it with international police networks, it links the security of navigation to international sanctions and energy flows
This extension demonstrates a structural shift: security of navigation is no longer just protecting ships, but a system of risk governance, alliances and knowledge production, extending from the sea to the insurance market to international sanctions networks. The question remains open after February 28, 2026: will Europe succeed in turning Operation Spades into a model for protecting sea lanes without military escalation, or will multiple alliances and politicization of the threat keep traffic and insurance rules dependent on the balance of political power rather than international law alone?
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